Abstract: This paper reflects on trajectories and pathways for philosophical hermeneutics, now, after the death of its founder, Hans-Georg Gadamer in 2002. More specifically, it challenges the notion that Gadamer's thought is simply tied to the linguistic turn of the 20 th century. Instead, it considers the possibility that Gadamer's thinking makes for an implicit declaration of its own kind, calling for a mnemonic turn in modern philosophy and present day hermeneutics. Some reference will be made to both rationalist and empiricist models of inquiry insofar as Gadamer attempts to take philosophy beyond, for example, the Ur-grammar of Chomsky's linguistic theories, and into a world of post-Platonic memory.
Upon his death in March, 2002, Hans-Georg Gadamer left behind not only a strong legacy of hermeneutical thinking for others to ponder, but an open-ended programmatic for abiding hermeneuticists to follow up and extend. Doubtless, Gadamer would expect his philosophical hermeneutics to be taken into intellectual areas that he himself did not have sufficient time to develop, and the final thought of Truth and Method speaks of this elliptical intent, to a world of interpretive possibilities. The work concludes with a reminder that, "It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word" (Gadamer 1975, 579) .
Philosophical hermeneutics is, in part, a birthchild of Kant, who, in 1784, responded to the question, "What Is Enlightenment?" Under the Latin dictum sapere aude, Kant urged his reader to "have courage to use your own reason!" (Kant 1963, 3) . This impression of detached reason (Vernuft) persisted throughout the early modern period of European philosophy, notably, with Bacon, Descartes and Kant. Such detachment indicated a moral autonomy from the unthinking heads of domestic cattle, often associated with obedience to religious tradition. At any rate, thinking for oneself, without the strong arm of academic tutelage, or the tutelage of a prejudicial history amounted to a valuable moral position. And with Kant, morality is, in the deepest sense of the word, only possible where the subject has thought things through with the requisite autonomy. Any action, derived from the authoritative thoughts of another, could only have incidental contact, at best, with the moral life. Most important, however, to the mindset of the early modern thinker, is that the emergent power and prestige of science had now given exemplary form to this notion of detached reason. The solitary scientist was said to be living in thoughtful isolation, beyond the questionable moral tutelages and encumbrances of history. Science, so highly conceived was thought to be revealing the world to us an sich.
This heavily gilded impression of our moral character is now, from the perspective of many, regrettably overstated, lacking a more subtle fortitude of thought. Thinking for oneself, as philosophical hermeneutics understands it, cannot ever really mean (1) a solitary scientific detachment from humanity, as if such a detachment is wholly possible, or, (2) that we simply ignore the historical past because of its "irrational superstitions", "gross sentimentalities", and "egregious errors". Nor can we ignore the past because of its obvious moral ineptitudes. The either/or division of moral thinking that ranges between history and every modern epoch is precisely a place where we can ascertain a sense of our own fallible condition of human understanding.
Sapere aude, or thinking for oneself, is a maxim that today's philosophical hermeneutics upholds. But such thinking cannot be confused with the likes of thinking in a present-day vacuum, divorced from the insight and richness that a former humanity has already given. Can we say, as Karl Popper once did, that responsible human thinking has so little use of others, i.e, those not attached to the immediate spheres of scientific influence and rational interest? This much is noted in the legacy of Popper, who, under the influence of Cartesian "novelty" once asserted, "I am not interested in tradition. I want to judge everything on its own merits… quite independently of any tradition … with my own brain, and not with the brains of other people who lived long ago" (Popper 1963, 162) . The general method or ethos of this is unmistakably Cartesian, but overstated all the same.
The exemplary expressions of Popper's independent mind surfaced in The Open Society and its Enemies, first published in 1945, later followed by his The Poverty of Historicism (1957) . Both works had an enormous appeal in Anglo-American philosophy, and both were committed to overcoming the "historical prophesies" of traditional (historical) metaphysics (or, what Popper simply refers to as historicism). The Open Society, Popper claims, "tries to show that this prophetic wisdom is harmful, that the metaphysics of history impede the application of the piecemeal methods of science to the problems of social reform" (1974, (3) (4) . 2 This transference, or, application of scientific method, from the natural to the socialsciences, is what troubled Gadamer most. As Gadamer believed, "The logical self-reflection that accompanied the development of the human sciences in the nineteenth century is wholly governed by the model of the natural sciences" (1975, 3) . The remainder of the text is conceived to correct this one-sided, scientific, approach to the human subject. Interestingly enough, and owing to Popper's commitment to rationalism (less empiricism), the Preface to the Second Edition of The Open Society notes something like a hermeneutical phenomenon alive in his thoughts. Here, thinking for himself still involved tending to thoughts and effects from the past, when he admits that "My own voice began to sound to me as if it came from the distant pastlike the voice of one of the hopeful reformers of the eighteenth or even the seventeenth century" (1974, xi) . Unquestionably, the spirit of John Stewart Mill was having an effect on Popper's philosophical and social interests in the 20th century.
In England, Mill's utilitarianism marked the beginnings of a "pragmatic" world, where the interests of science and epistemology, coupled with the immediate desire for social reform, dominated any discernible need for history. Mill's a-historical feelings were being gleaned from a European Enlightenment, one that argued that science would unravel and reveal the laws of nature, and so, unravel and reveal the laws of human thought. Inductive reasoning, considered valuable to scientific thinking ever since Bacon, was now being considered by Mill to be a methodological boon for social, political, and psychological realms of discourse. Through the logic of enumerative induction, and the law of some vague but discernible human happiness, the natural sciences had found their way into what Mill called, "the moral sciences". Only 10 years before his death, Mill's logic was translated into the German philosophical context, in 1863, using a new term, Geisteswissenschaften. The "science of spirit" for all that this would come to mean, became a facsimile of a former method, Naturwissenschaft.
To Mill's credit, he did not hesitate, in his Autobiography of 1873, to point out the deleterious amputation of "feelings" which inevitably accompanied his new moral science. In the year of his death, Mill was forced to admit that "feelings", while they may often be selfishly motivated, are not always the signposts and indicators of illegitimate thoughts. On the contrary, "the cultivation of feeling can be as instructive and heuristic as they may-at other times-be selfish and dogmatic:
Utility was denounced as cold calculation; political economy as hard-hearted; anti-population doctrines as repulsive to the natural feelings of mankind. We retorted [with] the word "sentimentality", which, along with "declamation", and "vague generalities", served us as common terms of opprobrium. Although we were generally in the right, as against those who were opposed to us, the effect was that the cultivation of feeling … was not in much esteem among us, and had very little place in the thoughts of most of us, myself in particular. What we principally thought of, was to alter people's opinions; to make them believe according to evidence, and know what was their real interest, which when they once knew, they would, we thought, by the instrument of [educated] opinion, enforce a regard to it upon one another. While fully recognizing the superior excellence of unselfish benevolence and love of justice, we did not expect the regeneration of mankind from any direct action on those sentiments, but from the effect of educated intellect, enlightening the selfish feelings. … From this neglect both in theory and in practice of the cultivation of feeling, naturally resulted …an undervaluing of poetry and of Imagination generally, as an element of human nature. ... I disliked any sentiments in poetry which I should have disliked in prose; and that included a great deal. And I was wholly blind to its place in human culture, as a means of educating the feelings (Mill, 1924, 77-79). 3 This quasi-aesthetic confession of Mill's is, in fact, is one of the explicit concerns of Gadamer's Truth and Method. My decision to embark upon a study of Gadamer has much to do with an interest in his anti-methodological and aesthetic approach to the human subject, thereby investigating the cognitive prejudice that modern hermeneuticists quite generally calls science. But it must be said that Gadamer's a-methodical advances are generally a result of a growing dissatisfaction in philosophy in the 19 th and 20 th century, when it was often watched over by scientific factions. But the "science" of anything human, all too human (to invoke Nietzsche) now seems lost, even forlorn, to those thinkers still alive to a more visceral sense of the humanities. Our own time is now confronted with the legacies of alternative philosophies including Nietzsche's revaluation, Heidegger's existentialism, James' radical empiricism, Wittgenstein's linguistic therapy, Derridean deconstructionism, Rorty's irony, Feyerabend's philosophical anarchy, and Polyani's personal knowledge, to name but a small sample of this diverse activity. In all cases, there is a deep suspicion (now to invoke Ricouer's hermeneutics) that the methods of the natural sciences can be fully utilized for the proper discernment of the human subject. There remains the suspicion that any sort of scientific hegemony should set precedence and parameters for our philosophical investigations. By the 20th century, this suspicion has gone well beyond anything like La Mettrie's Machine-Man, who, for his part writes, "To ask whether matter, considered only in itself, can think is like asking whether matter can indicate the time" (La Mettrie 1996, 3) . 4 Years later, on the English front, and contrary to La Mettrie, William James eventually succumbed to the unbreachable distance between (a) methodological science and (b) the freewill of the humanities. After the publication of his two-volume Principles of Psychology (1890), James quipped that he was through with "the nasty little subject [scientific psychology]; all one cares to know lies outside it" (James 1952, vi) . But his departure from the dilemmas of science and psychology would be, in may ways, short-lived. In the Varieties of Religious Experience, for example, chapter 1-"Religion and Neurology"-James returned to his favourite quarrel once alive in the Principles, (James 1958, 92) . 5 Beyond this, and other select chapters in the Varieties, there was also the emergence of his Pragmatism (1907), The Meaning of Truth (1909) , as well as A Pluralistic Universe (1909) . Each of these works betray James' persistent interest in both science and philosophy, and how the tender-minded and the tough-minded faculties might produce a practical conversation that avoids the extremes of either.
6 At any rate, the general conclusion one might draw from James' life and work, is that there can be no such thing as a pragmatic philosophy, where science and philosophy do not take each other seriously. 4 We can note that historical consciousness is under attack in this work, Machine Man. La Mettrie writes, "let us take up the staff of experience and ignore the history of all the futile opinions of philosophers. To be blind and to believe that one can do without the staff is the height of blindness. How right a modern author is to say that it is nothing but vanity which prevents one from using secondary causes to the same effect as primary ones. We can, and should, admire all of those great geniuses-Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Wolff, etc.-in their most futile labors; but pray, what fruits have we derived from their profound meditations and all their works? So let us begin, by seeing not what people have thought, but what we should think for the sake of an untroubled life" (ibid., 5). 5 The first chapter of The Varieties is titled "Religion and Neurology", one that returned James to challenge the idea that medical science could explain the gamut of religious experiences. Thus, "Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up St. Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex. It snuffs out St. Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox's discontent with the shames of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover. And medical materialism then thinks that the spiritual authority of all such personages is successfully undermined" (James 1958, 29 Still, despite James' conflicts, many modern thinkers have all found the scientific method less propaedeutic for the humanities than previously announced. Nor is their anti-methodological tenor simply a passing fact of our more recent intellectual history, especially when we stop to ponder, for example, Socrates' dissociation from the natural sciences in his day, or Kant's departure from a pre-critical philosophy in his time.
7 With respect to Socrates, the Phaedo retells of a different kind of Socratic ignorance, one that, in his youthful exuberance, was unable to discern a scientific condition from a rational, or reasoned, cause. In the Phaedo, Socrates recounts his youthful aspirations and his "extraordinary passion for that branch of learning which is called natural science" (Plato 1961, 96a) . Ultimately, the observed causes of the physical sciences produced even more confusion about the apparent freedom of the human subject. The hermeneutical question arises: how do we understand the human subject sitting unjustly accused in a jail cell? Anatomically? Physiologically? Chemically? Politically? Psychologically? Philosophically? Only later, then, does Socrates locate the importance of recollection (anamnēsis) for his philosophical theory of self-understanding.
Plato was perhaps the first thinker in the western intellectual tradition to call attention to the importance of memory-of already having in mind (as in French, deja-vu)-suggesting a vague but real re-cognition of what is, for example, beautiful, truthful, or just. It was this mnemonic recognition, in fact, which gave Plato's theory of forms (eidos) the psychē-logic they demanded. It is also within the progressiveness of Greek philosophy-in the Platonic division between a technical use of memory (technē), and recollection itself (anamnēsis)-where Gadamer centers his hermeneutical reflections, albeit in a more modern and contemporary idiom than even Plato would have imagined.
The earlier, Platonic division between technē (things made) and epistēmē (things discovered; aletheia) also illustrates that the former (technē), denotes a memory which is exclusively directed towards a posterior events, such as yesterday's news, or an already experienced world of fact and thing. This memory is most often directed towards mechanical, or rote, recall-to what Socrates called mere "reminders" (hypo-mnēsis). Plato's hypo-mnēsis can also be likened to what Helmhotz called a psychological tact in memory; 8 or what Hegel calls "mere representation" and "bare rememebrance" (Hegel 1988, 396) . Such a posterior forms of memory not only fixes their gaze pastward and externally, but more significantly, these reminders only serve to obstruct a greater, more internal, and universal application of memory (recollection).
The prejudicial obstructions of technē-i.e., technical memory-consumes our day-to-day thoughts, and prevent us from considering more of (a) what might still be forgotten of our existence (even if unintentionally) or (b) what I might be neglecting (intentionally) of existence. In general, the technical application of memory-the rote recall and persistence of a posterior thoughts and images-hinder and obstruct the emergence of new ideas.
In what is perhaps the principal example of technical and obstructive memory, Socrates warns Phaedrus of the technē of writing itself. He warns Phaedrus of its obstructive tendency; its woefully surrogated position with respect to recollection, discovery and epistēmē. Writing reveals a "conceit of wisdom" and an abuse of our most illustrious mnemonic capacity. The technology of writing illustrates, so very well, what the early Greek thinkers had in mind when they began to separate technē from epistēmē in their thoughts. The bifurcated terms indicate a conscious separation between rote, mechanical forms of memory (technē), and the more cherished process of discovery (epistēmē and anamnēsis):
If men learn this [writing] it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder [hypo-mnēsis] . And it is no true wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows' (Plato 1961, 275a) .
We may note that Socrates does not really bifurcate memory into two disparate worlds, memory and recollection, at least not yet. But he is undoubtedly aware that there are rote applications of memory, just as there are hermeneutical or interpretive applications. The latter applications live well beyond the mere mechanism of hypo-mnēsis, or "reminders". He therefore asks us to "exercise memory" (275a) to ensure that it tends towards this recollective and interpretative world, and less towards the mere reminder of things already known. Therefore, more than the division between technē and epistēmē, anamnēsis signals the division of memory into two forms of applied living. In fact, anamnēsis not only denotes a particular kind of memory, but a particular outlook upon the world. This, we would call the philosophical life. For Plato, anamnēsis represents the Queen of Memory. Regrettably, this particular form of memory and life is also the legitimate pilot-held captive-on philosophy's mutineered ship, as depicted in the Republic.
Perhaps more important for Plato, is that such a prestigious memory looks very far back indeed, beyond this-worldly experiences, all the way to prenatal circumstances. It looks back beyond the rote aspects of my particular existence, in an effort to penetrate and investigate an Ur-world of a priori life and ideas. It is safe to say that the mythological discourse of Plato's anamnēsis has been so embellished in this prenatal fashion, that the mythology has shrouded the significance that it might have for modern philosophical thinking.
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It is sufficient today that we translate Plato's prenatal mythology into the historical circumstance of our lives, and less meta-consciously. For modern hermeneutics, the prenatal mthology indicates nothing less, and nothing more, than history itself. What precedes my birth?
Certainly not an untainted moral soul, but the relatively long history of a struggling humanity. However we choose to think of it, anamnēsis presents the very kernel of the Platonic problemthe overly grand gesture of positing some Absolute or Universal Form of recollection, over and against all other practical and technical applications of human memory. Such absoluteness and universality-as Plato's anamnēsis gives-now reads to us like a estranged and anachronistic caricature of philosophical speculation. Therefore, even if we do recognize a distinction between a priori (future/universal) and a posterior (particular) kinds of memory, as Plato did; even if we do recognize that our understanding of the present and the future is inexorably tied to a disciplined understanding of the past, we now concede, after centuries of metaphysical speculation, and after the likes of, for example, Nietzsche (the "subterranean man" or "solitary mole" who "tunnels and mines and undermines"; Nietzsche 1971, 1), that this particular kind of memory (anamnēsis) can never secure "universal knowledge" (epistēmē) of any Absolute kind.
For this reason, the precise term given to us by Plato-anamnēsis-appears somewhat forlorn to us. As both Kant and Chomsky have intimated, Plato's rationalism was too high, and consequently, an uncritical empiricism has won the day. It is simply too spectacular-this high Platonism-for a philosophy of modern discretions. For this reason, thinkers in the present day have opted to take from Plato the significance of his theory-anamnēsis-while leaving behind both its pre-natal and post-natal conclusions. Even Hegel (1988, 160-161) would admit:
Plato's ancient saying is apropos here: that we learn nothing, but only recollect something that we originally bear within ourselves. Taken in an external and nonphilosophical way, this means that we recollect a content that we have known in a previous state [i.e., before this present life began]. That is its mythical presentation. But its implication is that religion, right, ethics, and everything spiritual in human beings, is merely aroused [erregt] . We are implicitly spirit, for truth lies within us and the spiritual content within us must be brought into consciousness.
More recently, Noam Chomsky has raised the significance of Plato's mnemonic theory in an effort to shed light on his own linguistic problems, problems he inherited from the Cartesian tradition of rationalism. Working within a more rationalistic frame of mind than the empiricism (or scientism) of behaviourism would allow, Chomsky opted to work through what he calls the "Cartesian tradition of linguistics". In this tradition, the fundamental enigma was, why vast arrays of thought and language cannot be reduced to the mechanistic model of the material sciences? How can a limited entity which is the brain can produce unlimited forms of linguistic utterances? Chomsky calls forth a variant of anamnēsis to help broach the Cartesian problem. He asks his audience "How can we interpret this [Platonic] proposal in modern terms?" He concludes that, A modern variant would be that certain aspects of our knowledge and understanding are innate, part of our biological endowment, genetically determined, on a par with the elements of our common nature that causes us to grow arms and legs rather than wings. This version of the classical [Platonic] doctrine is, I think, essentially correct. It is quite remote from the empiricist assumptions that have dominated much of western thought for the past several centuries, though not entirely foreign to conceptions of major empiricist thinkers such as Hume, who spoke of those parts of our knowledge that are derived "from the original hand of nature", and that are "a species of instinct" (Chomsky 1988, 4) .
Chomsky is satisfied with this proposal, as I believe he ought to be considering the type of empirico-rationalism to which he commits. He is, as he admits, a "child of the Enlightenment".
The roots of his linguistic theory are everywhere found in a host of thinkers after Descartes.
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But being committed to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, he does not explicitly develop a hermeneutical tack on the problem. His task is not any attempt to adjudicate the rational cogency of these myriad utterances, but only speak of their unlimited production. Apparently, then, he retains something of a scientific worldview that troubles a hermeneutical thinker such as Gadamer. Unlike Gadamer, for example, who drops the hegemony of scientific prowess from modern view, and who opts for an aesthetic approach to the problem of existence, Chomsky remains committed to a quasi-scientific advance on the problem.
The move Chomsky makes when amending Plato's theory of recollection involved dropping "innate truth" out of the philosophical picture, substituting it with an "innate capacity"-a genetic capacity-for the generative production of language, and the acquisition of new knowledge. New knowledge is born within us, as the rationalist's spirit reminds us. But it does not live there initially as Plato had led us to believe. It needs to be produced or generated. Innumerable interpretations may be foisted upon the world-none of which can be said to be innate-until such time as we come across one that apparently recognizes a truthful interpretation. Chomsky, for example, simply recognizes the cogency of the scientific worldview, whereas Gadamer recognizes this worldview much less, if at all. His recognition is based upon aesthetic assumptions of existence.
Nor does Gadamer believe in the Platonic notion of "innate knowledge". Like Chomsky, Gadamer sees in anamnēsis something of an inbuilt "capacity"-not for reason-but for some sense of hermeneutical self-understanding: a reasoned gesture all the same. Where Chomsky speaks more of an innate capacity for the acquisition of new knowledge, and the production of new forms of language, Gadamer speaks of humanism's guiding concepts. One in particular, he claims, is "the greatest idea of the eighteenth century" [Bildung] and "is the atmosphere breathed by the human sciences of the nineteenth century, even if they are unable to offer any epistemological justification for it" (Gadamer 1975, 9) .
The reference to the 19th century includes the heady influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 Humboldt ( -1835 in that century. It is interesting to note that both Chomsky and Gadamer support their contention for an "inner" world of thought-for both rationalism and hermeneutics-with the use of Humboldt's theory of mind and language-an innere Sprachform-or "imprint".
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Gadamer, for example, notes how Humboldt gives us not only the tools for the acquisition of new knowledge, but, along with J. G. Herder (1744-1803), provide us with the basis of an 18th century theory: Bildung. What lies within us is no mechanical use of talents (Begabung) or vocational aptitudes (Ausbildung), but is rather, according to Humboldt, a spiritual attitude or capacity, one that is fundamental to the development of knowledge and humanity. As Humboldt (1963, 266) confers upon his reader, "when we say Bildung in German, we mean something 10 For more on this thought the reader may want to consult Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (2002) . 11 Wilhelm von Humboldt was born in Potsdam and became a Prussian statesman, humanist, and linguist. His early education was derived from private tutors and involved, among other religious topics, Plato's ideas of the soul. As much as he is an Enlightenment trained thinker, Humboldt was likewise known for questioning the Enlightenment's most cherished presuppositions, such as those that lie in mathematical and overly-analytic advances. His contribution to both Chomsky and Gadamer lies in the idea that, beneath our mechanical use of language lies an intuitive and organic inner form of language; an innere Sprachform and an "unknown something". As he writes in his "Man in the Realm of Spirit", "For there is an imprint with which all great things that emanate from man are of necessity stamped, because it is the imprint of great humanity itself" (Humboldt 1963, 150) .
at once higher and more inward, namely the disposition which harmoniously imparts itself to feelings and character and which stems from insight into and feeling for man's whole spiritual and moral striving". Gadamer reminds us that it was Humboldt who raised the meaning of the word Bildung beyond its cultural and secular restrictions, to evoke "the ancient mystical tradition according to which man carries in his soul the image of God, after whom he is fashioned, and which man must cultivate in himself". He continues:
The transition is especially clear here because the result of Bildung is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual Bildung. It is not accidental in this respect that the word Bildung resembles the Greek physis. Like nature, Bildung has no goals outside of itself. ... In having no goals outside itself, the concept of Bildung transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents, from which the concept is derived [Ausbildung]. ... Thus the educational content of a grammar book is simply a means and not itself an end. Assimilating it simply improves one's linguistic ability. In Bildung, by contrast, that by which and through one is formed becomes completely one's own (Gadamer 1975, 10-11) .
But as Gadamer also notes, it was J. G. Herder who first introduced the concept of Bildung to the philosophical (read Kantian) context of the Enlightenment thinking.
12 Herder's contribution to the 18th century Aufklärung (the philosophical inauguration of Bildung) may have initially appeared culturally oriented at its root and branch, without the metaphysical character that Humboldt later "imprints" upon it. But Herder's Treatise on the Origin of Language 13 endeavors to illustrate the manner in which Bildung defies all such technical and empirical approaches to linguistic development, i.e, that we merely attach signs to the external world and remember these. Instead, Herder's Bildung makes a unique distinction between memory and recollection in a way not witnessed since the early Greek dialogues. Herder's distinction between memory and recollection tries to accomplish three (3) tasks: (1) to provide an account for the acquistion and development of human language: (2) to separate us from the world of animals, and: (3) to challenge the received notion of reason-as separate faculty standing above and adjudicating other aspects of mind, including memory. All three of these tasks hinge upon his bifurcation of memory and recollection, as found in the Treatise, the former which is technical and instinctual in animals, and the latter-recollection-which is universal, and unique to human existence.
Briefly, Herder is arguing that we lack the innate equipment of the animal kingdom, a technical aptitude that we call instinct. Instinct is a command that cannot be turned aside or ignored in the animal kingdom. Animals are the perfect Baconian subjects, wholly compelled to listen and obey to nature's commands (headed through instinct). In contrast to animals and 12 In this instance, Herder initiates an anthropological turn which is more than simply a cultural examination of the past, but concerned with the life and blood of historic peoples: embodied in their language. Herder may well be borrowing the Copernican metaphor, presumably used by Kant in lectures before it appears formally in the 1 st Critique. In Herder's "How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People", (published in 1765), he writes, "All philosophy which is supposed to belong to the people must make the people its central focus, and if philosophy's viewpoint gets changed in the manner in which out of the Ptolemaic system the Copernican system developed, what new fruitful developments must not occur here, if our whole philosophy becomes anthropology" (Herder 2002, 29) . 13 Herder's prize-winning essay written for the Berlin Academy written in 1771, published in 1772. insects, our discernible lack of instinct, in fact, increases our power of recollection making us into less compelled and more universal creatures. Subsequently, because we lack the technical intelligence of animals and insects, we excel in a capacity for interpretive freedom, leading us to more reflective position in and of the world. Herder's view of language is a hermeneutical viewpoint and a Socratic view all the same. We are wiser than animals and insects-not because of some Aristotelan animal rationale-but because we are the "most ignorant creature" when we come into the world (Herder 2002, 130 ). More importantly, we do not endure the obstruction of a technical instinct that animals endure. Our mnemonic capacity is freed from any and all particular burdens and restraints. Bildung, as Herder sees it, is mnemonically constituted through recollection, and this mnemonic constitution resists technical obstructions at every turn. Eventually the power of recollection over mere memory finds its way to a central position in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics:
… the nature of memory is not rightly understood if it is regarded as merely a general talent or capacity. Keeping in mind, forgetting, and recalling belong to the historical constitution of man and are themselves part of his history and his Bildung. Whoever uses his memory as a mere faculty-and all the technical side of memory is such a use-does not yet possess it as something that is absolutely his own. Memory must be formed; for memory is not memory for anything and everything. One has a memory for some things, and not for others; one wants to preserve one thing in memory and banish another. It is time to rescue the phenomenon of memory from being regarded merely as a psychological faculty and to see it as an essential element of the finite historical being of man (Gadamer 1975, 15-16 ).
It has not been my intention to incite a contentious debate between the "imprinted grammar" of Chomsky and the hermeneutuical "self-consciousness" (Bildung) of Gadamer, and nor is there any need to sound a polemical pitch between the two where there has been very little to speak of to date. But to suggest that they are philosophical compatriots on different intellectual shores is to exaggerate things all the same. For one thing, Chomsky's rationalism-unlike Gadamer's hermeneutics-does not view the terms philosophy and science just so distinctly and separately. Chomsky persistently reminds us of their mutual concordance in western thought:
In discussing the intellectual tradition in which I believe contemporary work finds its natural place, I do not make a sharp distinction between philosophy and science. The distinction, justifiable or not, is a fairly recent one. In dealing with the topics that concern us here, traditional thinkers did not regard themselves as "philosophers" as distinct from "scientists". Descartes, for example, was one of the leading scientists of his day. What we call his "philosophical work" is not separable from his "scientific work" but is rather a component of it concerned with the conceptual foundations of science and the outer reaches of scientific speculation and (in his eyes) inference (Chomsky 1988, 2) .
The "outer reaches of scientific speculation" engenders a problematic reference here, and we may bear in mind that with Chomsky all that is required for the creation of new linguistic expressions is that our language faculty is "awakened" by the "richness of experience". Still, it is sometimes unclear as to whether the strong rationalist in Chomsky can take seriously the very richness of interpretation that explicitly denies the ēthos of the scientific world, and that promotes a richness of experience that is often so alien to, and distinct from, science. It would seem that Chomsky must allow-if only in theory-a more ir-rational dimension to his linguistic theory, so he does not to narrow the richness of experience and human freedom to something that needs to be scientifically justifiable.
For my part, I believe that Chomsky's scientific rationalism does appear lenient towards a hermeneutical position, not just because he is prone to criticizing the scientific community in general, as complicitous members in a world of intelligentsia, or by criticizing its sometimes dubious membership (i.e., dogmatic empiricists). More than just these philosophical disclaimers, I find that Chomsky reveals hermeneutical sympathies because he often speaks of a "science-forming capacity" which, as he believes, is merely one capacity among others. Here it sounds as if science is but one form of the aforementioned richness of human experience, one form among others. It would be imprudent to ask science to give us answers where other capacities might speak more clearly. On this matter, Chomsky (1988, 156) writes:
The human science forming capacity, like other biological systems, has its scope and limits, as a matter of necessity. … There is, incidentally, no reason to suppose that all the problems we face are best approached in these [scientific] terms. Thus it is quite possible-overwhelmingly probable, one might guess-that we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology. We use [science] where we can but are not restricted to it, fortunately.
Yet, however open Chomsky may be to this kind of aesthetically inclined thinking, Gadamer remains the more forceful thinker with respect to philosophy's (a) aesthetic ends, and, (b) autonomy from science. As one who discusses more of the preponderance of science and method in the humanities, a preponderance which has all but eclipsed the importance of the aesthetic life, Gadamer sees the matter quite differently. In the "Introduction" to Truth and Method, as well as in the "Afterword", we see clearly the contextual bookends of Gadamer's hermeneutical concerns. In the "Afterword", for example, Gadamer felt the need to reiterate his hermeneutical position to assorted critics after its publication in 1960 (German) and 1975 (English). The "Afterword" is a significant addition to Truth and Method, and part of the text which is sometimes overlooked in deference to the other, more explicitly, hermeneutical contents. The "Afterword" is one of the most significant expressions of his work insofar as it introspects hermeneutics from within the larger context of 20th century, scientific thought. In this part of the text, Gadamer finds himself explaining, in a relatively apologetic manner, the heuristic relationship that science has for his philosophical hermeneutics. But this relationship can only come about when the one-sided weight of science relinquishes its hold on humanistic research.
The "Afterword" is a critical section of Truth and Method, one given to readers coming from disparate intellectual houses and sources. These sources include English Utilitarianism, American Pragmatism, Anglo-American Analysis, French Structuralism, Critical Rationalism, Critical Theory, as well as Theological Hermeneutics. Each may be considered an intended audience of the "Afterword". In this, the closing denouement of the work, Gadamer remarks that "philosophical hermeneutics participates in a philosophical movement of our century that overcame the one-sided orientation toward the scientific fact, taken for granted by neoKantianism as well as by the positivism of that time" (1975, 552) . Gadamer, in fact, views hermeneutics in just this universal way, not in the manner of a interpretive tour de force, but as a one-sided adjustment, deepening the waters of human experience by rescuing philosophical dialogue from the weight of traditional scientific methods.
Chomsky used a stock analogy in his lectures and books to explain how, in fact, we might begin to contemplate the interior privations of the human mind in a rational and justifiable manner, without succumbing to either invasive or just exaggerated modes of scientific experimentation. His hope is that this search for what is deeper inside our minds-its "deep structures"-can be seen, albeit darkly, through universal and grammatical properties of language. As he reminds empiricist factions, we can no more set up a laboratory inside the sun than we can have scientific access to the deepest interiority of the human mind. And he adds, "therefore what you have to do is look at the light that reaches you from the sun. You have to try to imagine what is happening on the inside of the sun that is producing that kind of light" (Chomsky 1988, 187) .
Language is, of course, analogous to light here, but the problem remains: every human being produces a very different kind of linguistic light, and social groups and linguistic cultures live within very different light schemes. The question is thereby enlarged for the human sciences, as it is for hermeneutics, which is to ask, how is it that human beings produce so much linguistic variety from a single source? Even more problematic is the persistent question, what is known about the source of this linguistic light?
In 1967, Richard Rorty's edited work, The Linguistic Turn drew attention to a gradual-but now explicit-turn to language in western thinking. His work surveyed various linguistic modus operandi, those considered to be of the most tangible means to the interior of the human subject. Whatever aims and goals were conceived of, some scrutiny of language appeared to promise some access to the deeper intentions, interests, prejudices, or just, recesses of mind. Albeit troubled by its own surfeit of theories, the linguistic turn provided modern thought with a general constellation of linguistic inquests-even hopeful conquests-derived from numerous intellectual perspectives.
Both deconstruction and hermeneutics have been abiding participants in this linguistic malaise, with deconstruction having made major in-roads into North American university departments of various kinds.
14 Regrettably, hermeneutics initially lagged in its North American reception, no doubt owing to what was an almost crazed reception of deconstruction in North America in the 1980s and the 1990s. Deconstructionism promised us an "open-minded" point of departure, 15 but not without an obscured theory of signs to contend with (and which had very minimal things to suggest of actual language users). However, the feeling may now be, in the aftermath and apparent erosion of deconstruction, that hermeneutics will become noted for what it offers: a more comprehensive understanding of language users, with an eye to both language and the often undetected effects of memory upon its development. 16 Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics suggests that, within the sphere of the language user, and behind the observable effects of language itself, there is more than simply the deep structure of a hidden, but somehow 14 For some further discussion about the spread of deconstructionism in both Europe and North America, see my interview with Barry Smith (SUNY Buffalo's Department of Philosophy), who submitted a letter to the Times in London, with 20 prominent signatures, objecting to Cambridge University awarding Derrida an honorary degree (Sims 1999, 142-169) . 15 Gadamer notes this very well in his hermeneutical dialogue with Derrida's deconstruction at the Goethe Institute in Paris, in 1981. In Gadamer's response to the "encounter", ("Destruktion and Deconstruction") he says, "Whoever wants me to take deconstruction to heart and insists on difference stands at the beginning of a conversation, not at its end" (Michelfelder and Palmer 1989, 113) . 16 Important for our consideration, then, is that the turn to language never aspired to leave the enigma of the human subject behind. It remained attached, as it were, to a Cartesian consciousness that others like Vico, Herder, and Gadamer had wanted to question. Where philosophical hermeneutics is concerned, language is an interminable aspect of all "self-consciousness" and it is impossible that we should isolate and emphasize one aspect-the theoretical-over the other, the practical. This, despite the insistences that deconstruction is a practical philosophy. discernible, Ur-grammar (Chomsky) . So too, he suggests there is more than whatever it is deconstruction had to offer. In Gadamer's mind, the is yet the vague form of a hermeneutical recollector. The interiority of Gadamer's hermeneutical sun is not a formal and functional grammatical process (though this Ur-grammar could never be excluded from consideration). There is, however, a curious Platonic archetype holding fast to some deep universal memories of existence. But if nothing like this, and if nothing else, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics may still act as a necessary "corrective" to the ramped up view that, only those theories that acquiesce to scientific methods and procedures beget proper conditions upon which modern philosophies must flourish.
The Preface to the Second Edition, then, speaks to this hermeneutical "corrective". Like Giambattista Vico before him (1668-1744), and with Kant close to mind, Gadamer attempts to unmask the seemingly "unassailable" conditions of scientific reasoning. Like Vico, and like Chomsky, he presents these epistemic conditions as simply another means of truth-making. This was, in fact, Vico's strategy with the scientific Cartesians in Italy. His polemical disoutations against the hegemony of scientific thought gave rise to his own theory of language-verumfactum ("truth is made"). A such, if we can free ourselves from unquestioned scientific suppositions, we inevitably free ourselves from particular (scientific) views of philosophy and language itself. All the virtues of science withstanding, its hegemony over language feigns too much of one kind of reality, and for too many language users. Gadamer (1975, 552) properly asks his reader, "can it be held against a philosophical approach that it does not consider scientific activity as an end in itself but, rather, thematizes the conditions and limits of science within the whole of human life?". With this question asked, there is a momentary, but still momentous "return to Kant" in Gadamer's hermeneutical consciousness, as when Gadamer asks, "what are the conditions of our knowledge, by virtue of which modern science is possible, and how far does it extend" (ibid., xxix). Reconstituting the universal in philosophy, through hermeneutics, therefore ushers in this one-sided corrective. All of this is well expressed in the Preface to the Second Edition:
It seems to me, however, that the one-sidedness of hermeneutic universalism has the truth of a corrective. It enlightens the modern viewpoint based on making, producing, and constructing concerning the necessary conditions to which that viewpoint is subject. In particular, it limits the position of the philosopher in the modern world. However much he may be called to draw radical inferences from everything, the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher, or of knowit-all does not suit him (Gadamer 1975, xxxvii-xviii 
Gadamer's tack is borrowed from Kant in this matter, and his aesthetic theory turns at this juncture towards what might be considered-in a still to be developed form-a more radical philosophy of science for our times. As a consequence of Kant's 1st Critique, one may still believe with other 20th century thinkers-such as Nicholas Rescher, Isaiah Berlin, Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur-that greater recollections and expanded meanings might still exist amidst the specialized advances of the sciences. An expanded picture of humanity has already been offered to us by Chomsky, for example, who, in an attempt to unlock the Ur-form of human grammar, takes us on a brief tour (or "chapter") of what he calls the "lost tradition of Cartesian linguistics". His point of departure is Descartes, but he does not restrict himself to Descartes' all too brief writings on language, nor even Cartesian thinkers in general. Furthermore, he seeks to comprehend the "generative" and "creative" (free) aspects of human expression, those construed inside a mechanistic, or even deterministic world. The problem that Chomsky takes from the 17th century is a scientifically framed problem after all, with a suspicious eye cast upon its empiricist attitudes. But we seldom hear it asked, how much science and reason can human freedom comprehend if it is to remain freedom after all? This is a thorny question that hermeneutics, for better of for worse, dares to ask.
The "lost tradition" from which Gadamer works is one that was initially opposed to the Cartesian worldview from the outset. It opposes the manner by which philosophy framed fundamental human questions within the strict confines of scientific procedures and terminology. The "lost" tradition, of which Gadamer is a member, takes its leave from Vico, a somewhat obscured figure in the history of western thought, and of whom Isaiah Berlin says was "born before his time … largely neglected in his lifetime and … [was] all but totally forgotten after his death" (Berlin 1976, 3) . It is Vico to whom Gadamer wants us to turn, in an effort to recollect properly yet another misunderstood or mis-remembered figure, Plato.
In Vico, the "generative" grammar and "creative aspect of language" is turned over to the alleged universality of memory and the coterminous birth of imagination and invention. With respect to the universality of memory that Vico endorses-a universal capacity that reaches across disparate faculties of mind- Vico (1968, Axiom 819, 313-14) writes, "Memory thus has three different aspects: memory when it remembers things, imagination when it alters or imitates them, and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrangement and relationship. For these reasons the theological poets called Memory the mother of the Muses".
Here there seems to be a suggestion, albeit speculative, about the creative aspects and generative properties of language sought by others-i.e., memory. Already, in his On the Study Methods of Our Time (1709), Vico challenged the mathematical and scientific hegemony of the period. He noted and lamented the dismal effect that these methods have had on the humanities. All tolled, Vico felt a decided lack of history in the Cartesian cogito. He concluded that this represented a serious denial of memory in modern philosophical studies.
To his credit, only more recently has Vico's mnemonic study and influence been resurrected by more modern thinkers. Donald Phillip Verene, for example, sees not only the recovery of Vico's philosophical acumen in the 20th century, but a variety of modern thought which falls under Vico's sphere of influence. Verene tells us that "Many minds have applied their ingenuity to Vico's work, and it is the nature of great thinkers such as Vico to present many sides for interpretation. My approach to Vico is philosophical" (Verene 1981, 19) . With respect to the mnemonic emphasis in Vico, Verene adds: I hold that Vico's ideas constitute a philosophy of recollective universals which generates philosophical understanding from the image, not from the rational category. This approach regards imagination as a method of philosophical thought, rather than as a subject matter to which philosophical thought can be directed. I believe the approach to Vico's thought through these two levels-the textual interpretation of his ideas and the apperception of their unity in the conception of philosophy as a special kind of recollective imagination-is the application to Vico of his own method of philological and philosophical understanding (ibid.).
Verene does not yet mention hermeneutics in this breath of reflection. But he has noted on at least one ocassion that Gadamer is "the only thinker of the first order in twentieth-century German philosophy to involve Vico as part of the basis of his thought" (Verene 1997, 138) . So it is to Vico that Gadamer turns in his hermeneutical search for lost time. Perhaps more important, Gadamer begins his search for a repressed hermeneutical memory, once hidden on the epistemic shadows of Plato's dialogues. Gadamer's study of practical truth (phronēsis), and its entanglement with scientific method (epistēmē) is amplified through a study of memory, now long after Plato. Vico's mnemonic studies become, as it were, a mnemonic device for the recovery of Plato's hermeneutical sensibilities. Gadamer's journey to and through Vico, back to the Greeks, likewise denotes the structure of experience itself (Erfahrung) promoted in Truth and Method. Gadamer's magnum opus is something of a cartography itself, endeavoring to steer our way back through salient aspects of historical philosophizing, to the recollective quality of the Greek philosophers. here he finds a a recollective world that has been shrouded by the postPlatonic tradition of epistēmē and method. With Truth and Method as his guide, Gadamer (1975, 221) comments on this mnemonic notion of experience, and writes, "What we call experience (Erfahrung) and acquire through experience is a living historical process; and its paradigm is not the discovery of facts but the peculiar fusion of memory and expectation into a whole". He later adds to this thought:
When I finished the present book at the end of 1959, I wondered whether it had not come "too late"-that is, whether its attempt to reassess the value of traditional and historical thought was not by then almost superfluous. Signs of a new wave of technological animosity to history were increasing. Correlatively, increased receptiveness toward Anglo-American theory of science and analytic philosophy, and finally the fresh impetus which the social sciences, particularly social psychology and sociolinguistics, were receiving offered no hope for the humanistic tradition of the romantic Geisteswissenschaften. But that was precisely the tradition from which I set out (ibid., 551).
In the manner of departing a darkened cave and reclaiming the source of all "shadows" and "mixtures" in the world, Gadamer urges that "the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside of science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself" (Gadamer 1975, xxii) . 17 Thus, it may well be conceded that the scientific study of memory-or even its reduction to a mere faculty in philosophy-is able to shed light on our philosophical tendencies. But it could also be said that sound philosophical conjectures, or hermeneutical gestures, might serve to check and balance these reductive approaches to memory, at least before our memory is handed over to mere mechanism first.
In 1978, Howard Bursen's Dismantling the Memory Machine did its part to disabuse us of the idea that memory could be adeqautely explained through mechanistic (neurological) assumptions. Although not able to tell us what lies beneath the enigmatic condition of having, holding, and recalling memories, Bursen's work is a convincing portrait of a scientific theory (the trace theory) which he claims is really no more than scientific conjecture, even pseudoscience, for the less inclined. Bursen endeavors to tell us what memory is not. Accordingly, it is not merely a product of biological traces as these empirical theories are fraught with questionable assumptions. As Bursen (1979, 150) concludes the work, we find ourselves a very long way from La Mettrie's Man-Machine:
All this is intended to convince the reader that there need not be a scientific, mechanistic, causal theory of memory. Magic is not the only alternative to science. The fact is that it was the attempt to provide scientific explanation for memory which committed the trace theorist to the existence of a magical mechanism. But we, on the other hand, have no such committment. In fact, the shoe is on the other foot. We said that any machine which had to do the things which a mechanistic memory theory requires would have to be a magical machine. That is, any mechanism which is supposed to do what people do would be a magical machine. But who says that people are machines? It is the trace theorist who makes this assumption, not we. Paradoxically, it is the trace theorist's attempt to extend scientific explanation beyond its proper bounds which commits him to magic. We, on the other hand, do not assume that there must be a scientific explanation for everything. We do not assume that people are machines.
For Bursen, memory remains a philosophical mystery, the resolution of which remains a formidable challenge to technical and scientific inquiries. For now, perhaps this much can be said at this time, that mnemonic researchers are beginning to suggest what these others have suspected all along. Memory is not reducible to a mere faculty of the brain. Nor is it simply one aspect of something we call the "mind". At the very least, it is important to reconsider memory as a universal affair of our self-constitution. It inheres in every aspect of our lives and self. Socrates tells Protarchus in the Philebus that "if you had no memory you would necessarily, I imagine, not even remember that you had been enjoying yourself; of the pleasure you encountered at one moment not a vestige of memory would be left at the next" (Plato 1961, 21b) . Others, like Augustine, found memory to be a central and significant aspect of the spiritual life, a place where, in the deepest interiority of the soul, one can locate their god. In a vague and uncalled for recollection, Proust found a passage back to the estranged interiority of a lost being, where "the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent" and "its disasters innocuous, its brevity illusory-this new sensation having had the effect, which love has, of filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was me" (Proust 1992, 51). Each of these deep enclaves of personal memory comprises an example of what Gadamer pursues in his hermeneutical thinking.
In his "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey", written in 1997, Gadamer continued to address many forms of modern linguistic inquiry. He concluded, however, that the historicallyeffected consciousness of philosophical hermeneutics is, in fact, more radical and liberal than the conservative forays of scientific research into language would suggest. Gadamers views of language and mind are very un-Cartesian in this respect, and unfamiliar to a mind reared by the heavy tutelage of "scientific accountability". As he contends, hermeneutics constitutes "more being than consciousness" (mehr Sein als Bewußtsein):
What I formulated with this phrase was not so much a task to be accomplished in the practice of art history or historical scholarship-indeed, it did not primarily have to do with the methodical consciousness in these disciplines-rather, it was concerned exclusively, or at least principally, with the philosophical issue of accountability. It was in this connection that I asked: in how far is method a guarantor of truth? It is the role of philosophy to make us aware that scholarship and method have a limited place within the whole of human Existenz and its rationality (Gadamer 1997, 27) .
As a consequence of this view, the interiority of Gadamer's hermeneutics goes further perhaps, beyond the linguistic structure, and inner world, of Chomsky's rationalism. Likewise, it asks us to go beyond our ordinary and everyday sense of memory, so often mired by a knowing technē.
Throughout, I have been claiming that Gadamer's hermeneutics is only partially tied to the 20 th century's linguistic turn. Another part-his hermeneutical memory-endeavors to interpret, and reinterpret the world, free of all methodical technē in philosophical research.
His hermeneutical memory comes with the constant reminder that, "It would be a poor hermeneuticist who thought he could have, or had to have, the last word" (1975, 579) . It is also fair enough to extend this proposal beyond hermeneutics itself, to other philosophical pursuits. It seems prudent to extend Gadamer's final thoughts towards something that is more than a vestige of the 20 th century's linguistic turn. Presumably, the elliptical experience of hermeneutical, interpretive memory would be salient for rationalists, pragmatists, and process thinkers alike, to name only some, each able to explore the mnemonic turn of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics:
The hermeneutic consciousness, which must be awakened and kept awake, recognizes that in the age of science, philosophy's claim to superiority has something chimerical and unreal about it. But though the will of man is more than ever intensifying its criticism of what has gone before to the point of becoming a utopian or eschatological consciousness, the hermeneutic consciousness seeks to confront that will with something of the truth of remembrance: with what is still and ever again real (ibid., xvii-xviii).
